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I would first like to congratulate Harald Wohlrapp on the substantial success of his book on the
philosophy of argument. The learning, originality, and energetic dedication shown in this work
are impressive indeed. Concerning Harald Wohlrapp’s theories, many fascinating issues arise, as
we will be hearing today and in further conversations. In this presentation I shall concentrate on
two aspects especially relevant to the treatment of pro and con argumentation; as will be
apparent, even on this single topic more could be said. What I will discuss today are the themes
of logicism and objectivity.
Though initially intrigued by my efforts to describe and explore conductive argument,
Harald Wohlrapp later concluded that my treatments were seriously flawed. Much of different
between our approaches concerns what he deems to be logicism on my part. By logicism,
Wohlrapp does not mean formalism. A formalist would insist that the premises and conclusion of
an argument be translated into the symbols of a formal deductive system, and the argument as
formally represented should be evaluated for its deductive validity according to the rules of that
system. Neither in practice nor in theory have I ever endorsed such an approach. What Harald
Wohlrapp finds to be logicistic, and as suggested by that label, objectionable, is something else,
something short of formalism as just defined. It is the representation of an argument as
constituted of claims amounting to premises and conclusion – what he refers to as a PPC model
of an argument. What is involved in this representation of an argument is extracting from spoken
or written discourse claims (premises) cited as providing reason for a further claim (conclusion),
so that one has articulated a product of explicit statements that one can scrutinize and assess.
‘PPC’ is used by Wohlrapp and by myself as a label for the approach of articulating these
statements. I would add that there can of course be sub-arguments, multiple conclusions, more
premises, and so on.
Harald Wohlrapp thinks that informal logicians have been unduly influenced by
traditions of formal logic when they take such an approach, as they characteristically do. For
him, PPC models are a legacy of formal logic and not a positive legacy. I would speculate to the
contrary that such models pre-date formal logic, which, insofar as it is a tool for evaluating
arguments, presupposes the identification of premises and conclusions. The identification of such
statements is a pre-formal task. Even if one insists on formalization, as a formalist would do (and
as I do not and never have), one needs to know which statements would need to be formalized.
One might contend that a problem with the PPC approach is that the natural language
discourse can be misinterpreted so that the claims explicitly stated and deemed by an argument
analyst to be premises and conclusions of a specific argument are not accurately drawn from
spoken or written discourse. For example, a person might fail to detect irony in a discourse and
erroneously deem a sarcastic remark to be a premise. Or she might fail to understand that a
rhetorical question, in context, is a way of asserting the claim that is the conclusion of the
argument. Indeed, such mistakes can be made, as anyone who has taught informal logic or
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critical thinking will be painfully aware. Whether a particular version of premises and
conclusions amounts to a correct interpretation of some discourse can be discussed, and proposed
renditions of the premises and conclusion can be corrected if they are deemed to be erroneous. If
amendment is appropriate, an arguer or interpreter can go through a process with a discussant to
explore that issue. That is to say, if person #1 represents a speech as expressing some particular
PPC argument and person #2 thinks #1 has made a mistake in doing so, #2 can say that to #1 and
they can proceed to explore the issue, referring back to the original discourse in its context,
seeking a better interpretation that is acceptable to both. If more discussants arrive on the scene,
they can contribute further questions and suggestions. I submit that there is nothing about
making explicit premises and conclusions that forbids or cuts off such a discussion.
But this is not quite what is at stake in the issue of logicism. Harald Wohlrapp’s concern
is not with the possibility of this sort of error. People can always makes mistakes, as I’m sure he
would be most willing to admit. In fact they can make mistakes when seeking to understand a
pragmatically focused process of the type urged by Wohlrapp too. A person might for instance
find it entirely clear that his fellow citizens would discuss considerations of law to be decisive, in
deliberations about public health policy. On that score, he could be correct but obviously, he
could also turn out to be wrong, as when an influential group decides to challenge the law and
receives support. But the issue of logicism does not stem from the possibility of misinterpretation
in describing either products or processes. Rather, it is much deeper and concerns the
understanding argument as a PPC product rather than as a process.
I must note that if there is a fundamental error here, I am certainly not the only person
making it. Before studying Wohlrapp’s book, it would have struck me as astounding that anyone
would have to defend the idea that arguments have premises and conclusions. But here we are.
And of course it must be acknowledged that the fact that many people have used this sort of
analytic strategy over a long time does not establish that the strategy is appropriate.
According to Harald Wohlrapp, what is wrong merits the term ‘logicistic’ is that this PPC
approach is a product approach. A product approach is not his approach. Fine. But we need to go
further to attempt to understand why this is not his approach. First of all, it does not fit into his
overall theory with regard to orientation, orientation gaps, research, pragmatism, and the
suitability of a thesis to serve as new orientation. Well, that much is obvious, but we need to say
more. There are reasons the PPC approach is not used in his theory. It is a kind of straitjacket or
tight corset, he says; it is limiting, because it is not open. I would dispute this claim for the
reasons already provided here: the fact that one begins a discussion by considering an explicit
statement to be a premise or conclusion does not prohibit or cut off discussion about its status
and accuracy. It does not make it impossible to amend, revise, or reject that statement or change
one’s ideas about its role. To Wohlrapp, the PPC approach seems too limited, too fixed. But I
would urge that it is far less fixed and limited than he seems to appreciate: people can together
discuss the representation. Furthermore, with any approach, one will have to leave out some
aspects of a phenomenon. Not everything can be described and considered. It will be a matter for
study or debate whether some particular omission or type of omission is significant or not.
There is a kind of micro-macro contrast to be drawn here between Harald Wohlrapp’s
approach and that of many others, including myself. Like most others who have pursued themes
of informal logic in papers, textbooks, and academic monographs, I have generally taken a micro
approach, extracting from a discourse some particular PPC product and raising questions of
interpretation and evaluation of arguments from that starting point. In contrast, Harald Wohlrapp
has taken a macro approach, offering a pragmatic theory of argument and cognitive progress
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based on a theory of social exploration and discussion. In a presentation written for the journal
Cogency, he cites a German saying to the effect that one can miss the forest for the trees. The
saying offers an important reminder. Reflecting on issues of macro and micro, I would add a
further reminder: one can also miss the trees for the forest. One may misunderstand the nature of
the forest if one does not understand what is happening to its individual trees. To move to a
different metaphor, I recall Isaiah Berlin’s fox and hedgehog. The fox, Berlin said, is interested
in many little things; the hedgehog is interested in one big thing. I guess at this point that I am
more like a fox and Wohlrapp is more like a hedgehog, though he is clearly entirely capable of
fox-like analysis. But the fox and the hedgehog will need to coexist and cooperate. What can the
fox say to the hedgehog, if she senses a risk that she will be overwhelmed by the hugeness of
things? She can say, wait a minute, hedgehog, just what are the details here? I think we all have
to be foxes some of the time. In fact I find ample evidence in Wohlrapp’s substantial book that
he can show fox-like tendencies when they are appropriate.
I now leave this theme for another one, the issue of objectivity. When discussing pro and
con arguments, observers including myself sometimes refer to weighing the significance of
various considerations or to one sort of consideration outweighing others. Literal weighing is
quantitative and objective, whereas the weighing of considerations is not so. The notion of
weighing in contexts where we deliberate about pros and cons is metaphorical. So too is the
notion of counting (as in ‘this factor counts for more here’) and even that of balancing. These
and similar expressions are extremely common in ordinary parlance and in philosophical writing
about ethics, policy, and law. Are they dead metaphors, and as dead, harmless? Or are they live
metaphors? Or at least alive enough to preserve their capacity to mislead? (I note here that the
expression “dead metaphor” is itself a metaphor, likely dead – but arguably not so.) The issue of
quantitative and objectivist overtones in such expressions as “weighing considerations” or “this
factor outweighs the others” is highly significant. Within the theory of argument, questions in
this area have been much discussed, though they seem to receive relatively little attention
elsewhere. One can largely avoid such expressions by adapting one’s language so as to speak of
“greater importance” and “more significance”. One can say things like “x should count for more
than y” but then of course one speaks of counting which, interpreted literally, would be
quantitative.
A former professor of mine, a brilliant man trained in Scotland in the analytic tradition,
used to speak of factors counting against a claim, or counting in its favour. I never understood
counting as quantitative, or his way of putting things as implicitly quantitative. This was many
years ago and perhaps I was young and naïve at the time. But I don’t think so.
My recent strategy would be defer to critics by selecting language that does not have
quantitative implications. In this way one can avoid or at least restrict implications that there are
quantitative answers to various questions. I note, however, that it is difficult to avoid all terms
that could, by some critic or other, be understood to have objectivist overtones. Interestingly, the
terms “balance”, “frame”, and even the word “open”, all apparently approved by Harald
Wohlrapp for use in the discussion of argumentation, can be so interpreted. And what the
strength or force of arguments? When we speak of other things being equal, does “equal” have
misleading quantitative implications? If one claim is said to support another, is the notion of
support physicalistic in its implications? Does it misleadingly suggest that an estimation of the
adequacy of the support of one claim by another should be made by an engineer? I don’t think
so, but we can see that a critic could raise such issues. A strategy of deference to critics is to
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avoid language that even arguably has objectivist implication, but it will not be easy to do that
and there is a case to be made that it is not necessary either.
Which expressions descriptive of mental and social processes are metaphorical? When
are metaphors dead and when are they not? If alive, when are metaphors misleading and when
are they not? Can dead metaphors be brought to life? And how significant are translation issues
in such contexts? I can only leave these questions open while pointing out that they arise for
many terms and not just the weighing of various pro and con considerations.
Significant in several respects is the textbook context of several of my discussions,
including that in the fourth edition, considered specifically by Harald Wohlrapp. Users of the
text, typically trained in analytic philosophy, were sometimes resistant to the notion that there
could be such things as conductive (pro and con) arguments for which the text provided no
assessment algorithm. They wrote me, urging me to include further directions for assessment.
Attempting to accommodate their demands, I was pushed in an objectivist direction. Of course I
did not have to give in to that push and shift accordingly. For any mistakes made in the shift, the
responsibility is clearly mine. But the phenomenon may be of some interest: we push for
objective answers, even when the push is inappropriate.
I would like to state here that these several decades after Harald Wohlrapp and I became
interested in the phenomenon of pro and con arguments, there are significant areas of agreement
between us. We seem to agree that there is no general recipe or algorithm for the significance of
various pros and cons on a particular issue. We agree that the implication that one can use
methods to arrive at a single objective answer is an unfortunate one. We generally agree on the
reasons for a lack of objectivity at some stage, despite our differences concerning product and
process approaches. Why the lack of a general algorithm? From my own perspective: topic
specificity and context relativity. Why the lack of objectivity? The subjective nature of
significance or importance. From one perspective or ‘frame’, a consideration may be of great
importance; from another, it may scarcely matter.
This matter should be obvious, but in case it is not, consider the following example. In
considering a move to a rural environment, a London mother of two asthmatic children might
decide that family health is her most important consideration. (It outweighs or trumps all the
others.) A consulted friend might urge that the move will adversely affect her income and career
prospects; she will consider these factors but deem them less significant than family health
unless she shifts her frame of reference. These two could deliberate together and discuss their
different perspectives. What is more important? Career? Income? Family health? We cannot
correctly say there is a general answer to this question about the comparative importance of
various factors, such that this general answer that can be worked out, derived from the
application of a reliable general algorithm, and defended and communicated to others facing
similar problems. What is this woman doing in her career? How ill are the children? How likely
is it that a move would improve their health? Much reasoning and deliberation can be pursued; in
the end, she will make a decision based on her priorities and values. She may decide that health
is more important, that career “counts for less” than health that health considerations “outweigh”
those of career, at least for her, in this context. Another person in a similar situation might decide
otherwise and have reasons in support of that decision.
For many issues and problems, different people take different perspectives or frames, as
Harald Wohlrapp would put it. And there is no one perspective that is demonstrably the ‘right’ or
‘most appropriate’ one. It makes sense to consult. Given that fact of epistemic and social life, it
is not reasonable to expect a single objective response when there are pros and cons. One can,
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however, defend some decisions as more reasonable than others; relativism, whether epistemic or
ethical, is not entailed at this point.
Harald Wohlrapp and I agree on a number of significant matters emerging from the
consideration of pro and con arguments. I urge that acknowledgement at this point is entirely
compatible with understanding arguments as having premises and conclusions that can be
adapted, rejected, considered and revised, by persons deliberating in quest of reasonable
decisions. There are matters of judgment, and we can have reasons for our judgments.
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